29 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

: DCI Perspectives

Excellent points. Plo phase to DD1.

- 1. I would like to pass on a few personal thoughts to DDI for possible inclusion in whatever they are drafting as your comments on the "DCI Perspectives," but thought I should check with you first. Here goes:
 - a) The "Perspectives" do not once mention the KGB or the GRU, or U.S. counterintelligence. As a fair amount of Community resources is dedicated to counterintelligence, the "Perspectives" should include a brief paragraph on this topic.

agree

- b) I have difficulties with the following sentence from page 2: 'They (the Soviets) will also favor the use of state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military fields over the use of 'revolutionary politics' which, however, will continue to be exploited in favorable situations." This ignores covert action as a tool of Soviet foreign policy, except for "revolutionary politics," which is a vague term, and can be construed as implying only support to CP's and radical groups against constituted governments. It would not necessarily comprise: Soviet use of the Somalis vis-a-vis the FTAI; the support, through the Cubans, of the Manley regime in Jamaica; or attempts at manipulation of nationalists groups in South Africa; for example. The sentence could be rephrased to suggest that the Soviets will use all means at their disposal--diplomatic, economic, military, psychological and subversive—to advance their world-
- c) It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the "Perspectives" format, but there is a great deal of duplication of thought and even of language between Parts I and II. For example: from Part I, page 2: "The Soviet Union and the U.S. will remain

wide interests and weaken their adversaries.

Ref: NETE-6-22.1/54

principal adversaries during the next five years."
From Part II, page 11: "The USSR will remain our major intelligence target." From Part I, page 5: "In Western Europe the Northern developed states and the more volatile nations of the Southern Tier (whom does that not include?) are undergoing critical changes."
From Part II, page 12: "Western Europe will continue to be an area of critical intelligence concern..." Some condensation could be attempted.

d) If this is to be the 'motherhood' document of the country's foremost analytical and estimative intelligence organization, it should be written in decent English. I wonder what the new Administration will think of our ability to convey intelligence clearly and concisely to policymakers if their eyes fasten on this passage from page 17:

"Guidelines for Planning. The likelihood remains high that localized economic, social, political, and military events will interact with the real or perceived power relationships of the major power blocs in ways which will engage priority US national interests. This presages a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence Community."

Would not "local crises which affect US interests will probably require increasing attention from the Intelligence Community" fill the bill? This dreary computerese infects Part III throughout, but you can find examples elsewhere such as the, in my view, erroneous use of the word "subsets" on page 12. Could a skilled editor from, say, the NID Staff, be asked to do a cleanup?

2. Would appreciate your comments.

A little editing africans

25X